simply speaking

simply speaking.

[ or ]

meaning as use(less)?

© jeremy rose 2007

 

Abstract

Language is simple. The concept of a structurally unsound communications method, whereby no definition is fixed, or even extant, is a hypergeneralization of a relatively benign statement of the nature of definition. Why are humans of the same language background mutually comprehensible? What’s in a definition? From where comes flexibility in such a rigid system? A common language implies a common structure of definitions, resulting in mutual comprehensibility. A definition is a simple tool whereby a word is linked to its interpreted sense through a non-exclusive symbiotic binary relationship. Flexibility comes from within, as evolution, rather than from out with, as revolution. Context is king in a world of blind listeners. Mutual understanding is simply the result of a flexible model of interpreted and societally distributed definitions. Anarchy and absolute usage-based scenarios defy the common sense that all children act upon and adult philosophers attempt to deny. The model is not only clear; it is incontrovertible that, for understanding to take place, a common, vague definition must be implicit in the utterance.

 

Simply Speaking.

To say that meaning is use[i] is simply[ii] an exercise in understatement. The statement is sufficiently vague[iii],[iv] to complicate the study of the philosophy of language for centuries to come[v]. That is, if it is not dramatically simplified. The concept of a structurally unsound communication method, whereby no definition is fixed, or even extant, is a hypergeneralization of a relatively benign statement of the nature of definition.

What little common sense is left in the contemporary world[vi] must still dictate that, as simple electronics needs must[vii], human communications interfaces rely on common definitions for theoretical understanding[viii]. This must be prefaced with the following statements of intent.[ix] Words are not defined by a conceptual[x], ideal[xi] state of being. They are not restricted to a single definition[xii]. This definition model includes a certain degree of flexibility.[xiii]

The positive side of this model is structurally simple but incredibly complex in its application[xiv]. Firstly, a discussion of the physical world and its relation to language has no place here and shall not be addressed.[xv] That being said, definitions shall be assumed to be linked not to objects but to thoughts.[xvi] In the sign system that is commonly referred to as human language[xvii], random signs are assigned[xviii] to signified thoughts in an initial instance.[xix] Repetition and social acceptance of this correlation is quickly solidified[xx], to the point that, for the foreseeable future, even in the circumstance that another sign is used for the same signified[xxi], the connection is still firmly in existence.[xxii] Thus definition exists, in an active sense, imposing its framework onto a society, as society creates definition in a thoroughly random manner.[xxiii]

That being said, several questions arise. These must be examined in detail but, simply put, they are the following. Why are humans[xxiv] mutually comprehensible? What’s in a definition? From where comes flexibility in such a rigid system? Likewise, the simple answers are as follows, respectively. A common language implies a common structure of definitions, resulting in mutual comprehensibility.[xxv] A definition is a simple tool whereby a word is linked[xxvi] to its interpreted sense through a non-exclusive[xxvii] symbiotic[xxviii] binary[xxix] relationship[xxx]. Flexibility comes from within[xxxi], as evolution, rather than from without, as revolution[xxxii]. These answers, however, must not only be explained but also defended.

The vast majority of language users give mutual comprehensibility no thought at all, until presented with a situation that involves another tongue. As definition linguistic models are intra-language in nature, this external influence has no place here for discussion. Why, then, are humans of the same language able to speak without rational fear of significant miscomprehension without contemplation? The answer to this question is staggeringly simplistic – so much so that it is acted upon by children, each and every day.[xxxiii]

Language is the art of naming – not simply naming objects, but naming concepts.[xxxiv] From the most concrete of nouns to the representative actions of verbs and from the lowliest relative pronoun to a conceptual, subjective adjective, no linguistic utterance is complete without its interpreted meaning, in tow.[xxxv] The learning of these meanings is the most human of practices – trial and error. For a child, the error column is decidedly well stocked but, as time progresses, the native speaker makes fewer errors and is able to construct meaningful sentences, correctly placing textual signs so as to communicate thought.[xxxvi]

Language is social. No lifeless dictionary holds the key to definition. It is a living model, often parent to child, but not exclusively so, of non-discrete binary relationships between utterance and interpreted concept. It is through this internal dictionary relationship that words are meaningful to contemporary common-language speakers. This does not, in any way, imply that the definition is exact, fixed, for any given utterance. It is simply the case that a relatively close understanding of the majority of linked utterances is sufficient for comprehension and interpretation by proximate interlocutors.[xxxvii]

When the word dog is uttered, the precise definition in the mind of the speaker and that in the mind of the listener are necessarily divergent, to a point. They are not, however, randomly anarchistic, as is typically understood to be the meaning is use model. The proximity of definition between speaker and listener is sufficient for mutual comprehension, insofar as a four-legged, profusely fur-ridden animal of pet-like behavior is interpreted by both. Specific traits of the dog in question are the purview of further conversation by these two imaginary humans and do not classify themselves as a poverty of the definition, rather as the necessity for descriptive language, as a fundamental rule.[xxxviii],[xxxix]

This is where the second primary question raises its head. What is in a definition?

From the simplest perspective, a definition is little more than a link between an utterance and its related concept. It is here where the issue tends to become derailed with analogies. The typical link metaphor is that of string tied to both word and object. It is far easier to outline the fault with this problem than to attempt understanding without any metaphor whatever. Firstly, the string metaphor implies, falsely, that words name objects. This is a fundamental misconception, at best. Words name concepts, the vast majority of which have no physical existence, whatever. The Christian attempting to tie a string to God is a humorous visual aide, used frequently to dispel thoughts of words as naming mechanisms, yet curiously strong as a supporting agent for words, in their capacity to name concepts. The other error in this illustration is the discrete binary relationship that physical adherence implies. Tying a string to an object typically means that a one-to-one relationship occurs. Even in a more complex model, where two objects may be tied to the same word, a mutual connectivity that does not exist in theoretical language models is imbued onto the image.

To review, simply, language names. It does not simply name objects, but concepts. Not only nouns name; conceptual interpretive relationships are not only possible but also necessary for all mutually comprehensible utterances.

A definition, then, is a series of virtual unattached pieces of string. They link word to concept, without ever tying down either end of the equation. It is in their ability to perform such tasks repeatedly that mutual comprehensibility is achieved by common language speakers.

In this unattachedness, flexibility ensues.

There is no chaos in language. It is not a series of self-redefining, unattached concepts, whose very lack of definition makes language a structural nightmare of relativism and usage confusions. Much more structure is present, even necessary. Comprehension relies on a model of commonly understood definitions. These need not be written in a book or mutually exclusive, yet they must exist.

This, however, has already been understood, simply through the application of common sense. It is the flexibility that is the confusion in the mix. It is, however, much more simplistic than the model would imply. Words change their meaning, simply by repeated usage. This does not imply a sharp break with the old and an entrance of the new; it is an evolutionary process. Words such as bad or wicked are fundamentally excellent examples, insofar as they exhibit definitional properties on both extremes of the human sentimental spectrum. In a strictly academic environment, both of these words convey an absolute negative on the ethical scale. In a more colloquial setting, particularly one of young, popular culture, the interpreted concept for both becomes the very opposite – an absolute positive. Why this particular slang exists is not the important question. The example simply illustrates that, over time, a definition model may accept two fundamentally opposed definitions, without either losing its force of comprehensibility.

Context is king[xl] in a world of blind listeners. Mutual understanding is simply the result of a flexible model of interpreted and societally distributed definitions. Anarchy and absolute usage-based scenarios defy the common sense that all children act upon and adult philosophers attempt to deny. The model is not only clear; it is incontrovertible that, for understanding to take place, a common, vague definition must be implicit in the utterance.

Words hold meaning. This is not necessarily specific, nor is it unchanging. What it is, is simply a dictionary of the mind. Be it through parental guidance, societal adoption, or explicit, forced evolution of the language, understanding is a result of common conceptual relationships.

 

[i] While this is a statement commonly attributed to the later works of Wittgenstein, this is a truly vague understanding of his theory on definition. The statement holds true in cases ranging from the most extreme Wittgensteinian approach, that meaning does not truly exist in any fixed sense but is derived completely from context, to the opposite extreme, where meaning is socially constructed and fixed in its existence, from that point forward. While the truth likely lies somewhere between these two points, it shall suffice to say that the statement, “meaning is use”, cannot be safely used as an expression of either extreme.

[ii] It is important to understand that I am not, in any way, attempting to negate the complexity of language. What is being presented here is a simplification of the model whereby definitions are communicated, not the concepts themselves that are inherent in the signs. This is not a necessarily nominalist argument, whereby signs stand outside the world of the real; more so, it is an argument against the hypercomplexification that exists in many modern understandings of contextual sign creation.

[iii] It may be useful to look at the source for this contemporary vagueness. In the Philosophical Investigations, the nearest text reads, “For a large class of cases […] in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use […] and the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.” (See following footnote for reference.) This unclear structure implants an uncertainty of meaning into a relatively benign statement. Wittgenstein is implying, here, not that words derive their meanings from social interaction but that they often do so. As he ignores this discrepancy in logic for the remainder of the document, I believe that it can be concluded that this is simply one in a series of errors and must be ignored. That completed, the statement simply reads that meaning is derived from social construction, an assumption that will be necessary for continuing in this line of thought.

[iv] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, §43 (New York: Prentice Hall, 1999).

[v] Admittedly, an assumption, since centuries have not yet come, since the writing of the Philosophical Investigations, I must admit.

[vi] The obvious implication here is the so-called common-sense metaphysics is a far cry from the purely nominalist, social-construction-oriented theories that are fundamental to an understanding of a sign system where the signified is not real without the sign. While the vague notion that is held of the works of G. E. Moore (particularly in The Refutation of Idealism, originally published in 1903) and the like is that philosophy is the study of obvious and sensory truths, I believe that the study of language cannot be treated in such a reactionary manner. It would be, for example, quite dangerous to imply that there is a direct correlation, regardless of time lapsed, between the word dog and the physical being with four legs, tail, and wet nose. This being said, I assert that there is little danger in a correlation between the word and a theoretical construct, avoiding the discussion of whether this construct is social or private, for the moment.

[vii] While it may not be common sense, it is certainly common knowledge, the functioning of a Turing machine or a binary circuit. These electronic atoms, so to speak, are based on the premise that a value is 0 (false) or 1 (true). This binary simplification is the basis for all communication, necessarily so, since electric impulses are forced to function in the same way. This is not to say that language is reducible to simple truth statements, since this is not a debate for which this document is sufficiently long to address.

[viii] For a sign system to work, in its most rudimentary sense, a definition structure must exist. The implication of this concept is much larger than the simple statement but, for now, a basic agreement that definitions are necessary for a sign system to exist and that language is inherently such a sign system is all that is required to continue reading.

[ix] While it is typical to give a positive definition and defend against contradiction with its negative counterpart, it simplified matters greatly here to begin with the negative version before developing its positive correlative.

[x] Simply put, conceptual, in this instance, means imaginary and artificial.

[xi] There is no reference to Plato or any contemporary interpretation of his works in this usage of the word. The only implication here is that ideal refers to an artificially positive construction of the definition.

[xii] This is not to say that words are incapable of being defined by a single meaning; it simply allows for the possibility that there may be several possible definitions. I propose that these definitions are selected by a system of rules, ingrained in the users of language by societal convention, repetition, and explicit training but this is not fundamental to the argument.

[xiii] While these statements are (very) loosely based on a contemporary and extremist reading of de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale, originally published in 1916, it would be unsound to attribute them to him, as they are strikingly removed from his stated intention.

[xiv] Hopefully, this will satisfy those unnamed critics who assert that complexity in language is the only thing that separates humans from animals. If this is not sufficient, I highly recommend attempting to train a goldfish in the art of formalist poetry but this, I must admit, is well outside the purview of this document.

[xv] That this is not placed in a footnote but rather stated in the text should be an obvious indication that, while I am an extreme nominalist, this argument does not rely on acceptance of a complete elimination of the real.

[xvi] Not necessarily private thoughts; the possibility is just as great that social, collective thoughts are the basis for the system.

[xvii] It is important to note that not all sign systems are language nor are they all human.

[xviii] There is a question of chicken vs. egg, in these cases but this shall be henceforth ignored.

[xix] Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics (Pittsburgh, PA: Open Court Publishing, 1998).

[xx] Peirce, C.S. “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” (1878) Popular Science Monthly 12: 286–302. Reprinted CP 5.388-410.

[xxi] Or, I must confess, the opposite.

[xxii] If this can be seen as an argument for the creative, active power of language, then so be it. It does not, however, lend any support whatever to the spurious yet unrelated argument set forth in Austin’s How to Do Things with Words.

[xxiii] This may be the best argument, although it will not be developed as such here, for the lowest-common-denominator principle of humanity’s collective mindless nature. It is simply an extrapolation of the early works of William of Ockham, viewed through a popular culture lens.

[xxiv] (of the same language background)

[xxv] Coquet, Jean Claude. Sémiotique Littéraire : Contribution À L’analyse Sémantique Du Discours (Tours: Mame, 1973).

[xxvi] As has been seen before, this implies a binary linkage. This is not necessarily the best way to understand such a system, however. There is a flexibility in the human mind that is not present in that of an electronic or electrical circuit, whereby change and multi-path logic is possible (necessary). What this implies is that a single sign may have an infinite number of signifieds and that one signified may have an infinite number of signs. What this cannot detract from is the understanding that, in a single sign system (language), all signifieds for a single sign are intrinsically linked, to a certain degree, by a social constraint of correlative meaning and that that all signs for a single signified must be (perhaps, more strongly) linked, through the same procedure.

[xxvii] What is meant by non-exclusive is simply the concept that this is, at once, a one-to-many and a many-to-one relationship, without ever metamorphosing into (Wittgenstein’s dream scenario in the P.I.) a many-to-many relationship.

[xxviii] This does not imply, nor does it preclude, a one-to-one relationship, which may, in point of fact, be the case in the vast majority of examples.

[xxix] Binary implies that there are two sides to the relationship, not that each side is limited in quantity or scope.

[xxx] The important word here is relationship, rather than rule. Relationship implies flexibility. This mutability of language is highly developmental and minimally destructive, however. Once created, a linguistic link is a strong bond. This is not to say that it cannot be broken, with the insertion of time and a replacement value (also possible is a removal of necessity for a particular sign or signified) but it is to say that it is far less common than the creation of new words or meanings, to use the common terms.

[xxxi] This statements requires no defense but its definition. A sign system that is created by social conditioning and training is only able to be modified by the users of such a system. In addition, even though this concept does not require a second definition, all humans, to be considered as members of the societal construct that it embodies, possess language. There are no outsiders to modify the system, even if it were possible.

[xxxii] The typical contrast between evolution and revolution is the speed of change. As I have alluded before, the speed issue here is one of direction, not of procedure. This artificial velocity construct does not exist here, therefore.

[xxxiii] Knight, Chris, Studdert-Kennedy, Michael, and Hurford, James R. The Evolutionary Emergence of Language: Social Function and the Origins of Linguistic Form (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[xxxiv] Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics (Pittsburgh, PA: Open Court Publishing, 1998).

[xxxv] Deleuze, Paul and Patton, Paul. Difference and Repetition (London & New York: Continuum, 2001).

[xxxvi] Dirven, René, and Verspoor, Marjolyn. Cognitive Exploration of Language and Linguistics: Cognitive Linguistics in Practice (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Pub. Co., 1998).

[xxxvii] Knight, Chris, Studdert-Kennedy, Michael, and Hurford, James R. The Evolutionary Emergence of Language: Social Function and the Origins of Linguistic Form (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[xxxviii] Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics (Pittsburgh, PA: Open Court Publishing, 1998).

[xxxix] McMahon, April M. S. Understanding Language Change (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[xl] Queen, also, I would assert.