Narrative as History’s Replacement

Analysis of Falling and Seeing the Air

An analysis of two partial short story collections by the author.

© Jeremy Rose 2007

 

Narrative as History’s Replacement

“Fiction is not imagination. It is what anticipates imagination by giving it the form of reality.” – Jean Baudrillard

 

Narrative is simply the beginning[i]. History is not truth[ii], nor is it the opposite of truth[iii], since it exists on a scale outside the constraints of a logical truth[iv]. It exists beyond the constraints of fact[v], of objectivity, and is simply created by the one and transmitted to the many[vi]. It does not exist, since it has been represented by narrative[vii] and, since this narrative has become accepted, history as it is conceptualized has been replaced by narrative[viii].

To explore this concept, we shall attempt to answer three fundamental questions. When does history exist? Where does history exist? How is history created? The third of these questions is answered mostly by example, in the accompanying text. The first two are much simpler and, as a result, this can be considered only a supplementary document. As means of explanation, the two accompanying texts are the first two short stories from collections pending completion and publication, the first entitled Falling[ix], and the second entitled Seeing the Air[x]. They have been included, with their respective introductory sections, but without the remainder of the texts, in the interest of the appropriate level of quantity for this type of submission. It was believed more useful to include samples of two different texts, rather than samples from one text, for the purpose of multiple perspectives on the multi-perspective property[xi] of historical narrative.

When does history exist?

History is not the past, nor is it the present[xii]. We do not live history[xiii], since what we live is life itself[xiv]. We are situated in a present against whose backdrop we fulfill our daily rituals and culturally-imposed norms, occasionally stepping outside of them to effect change[xv]. This is not, however, history. It is present action and, while that may be the raw material for history, to say that history is created in the present is to say that a dead leaf is petrol, without seeing the steps between, the time, the pressure, and the refining. These three aspects are the defining points of history’s point of existence. It requires time, pressure, and refining to exist.

History is not the present but it is in the present. In short, the answer to the title question is, history exists now[xvi].

What does that mean for history, however? Firstly, it defines it in time; secondly, it defines it in substance. The question of time is both a simple and a complex one. On the most obvious stage, nothing exists but the present, repeating itself throughout a continuum called chronology[xvii], as disparate moments experienced simultaneously[xviii]. The added complexity is provided by a notion of past, however[xix]. How are we to know what happened in the previous moment?

Three possible answers arise to that question – experience, memory, and history.

Experience is the result of the present. We experience things in the present and they are relegated into memory, once the present is no longer with us. Experience, then, is no benchmark against which the past may be judged. It cannot exist outside the present, since it is a question of senses. Our senses only work in the present. Experience, then, while a possible answer, becomes an unfeasible one[xx].

We move on to memory, then. This answer has much more potential, since it is fundamentally a past-oriented concept, rather than a sensory-based one. The memory is the record that the mind keeps for its human of those sensory perceptions of presents turned to past. How do we know what happened in previous present moments, then? Through our memories[xxi]. The narrative that is constructed in our heads, individually, so that we may replay important moments like recorded video, experiencing each nuanced detail in staggering quality, as it is passed through the senses again, somewhere between dream and reality[xxii].

It’s broken, however, this function[xxiii]. Whether it always was broken or it has become corrupted somewhere along the human development line, we cannot be certain[xxiv]. I would like to think that, in the interest of progress, it never worked properly. But this is only a guess and, admittedly, an idealistic one, at that. That aside, however, memory does not work. It only takes a short venturing into a courtroom, that most fundamental demonstration field for the incapacity of humans to use logic in practice, to see a startling picture of memory at work[xxv]. Two witnesses describing the same event vary between minor differences to blatant dichotomies. Three or more witnesses create what becomes a collage of narratives, intersecting at a variety of points but never touching edge-to-edge.

The problem is not, inherently, memory, which is simple binary data storage in the hippocampus in the medial temporal lobe[xxvi] (I claim no expertise beyond this in how, medically, this procedure functions). This memory is accurate insofar as it represents the authentic sensory perception of the original experience[xxvii].

This poses two problems, however. Firstly, and most obviously, the original sensory perception is likely flawed, since human sensory perception is limited and, by definition, therefore, flawed, due to its incompleteness. Secondly, and more importantly, there is no direct link between communication and the medial temporal lobe[xxviii]. There is, between those two points, a variety of interpretive, creative, and linguistic acts. All three of these categories instill the memory with a narrative quality, altering the original memory, converting memory into a narrative voice[xxix].

It is at this point where memory ceases to exist, then, and becomes history. That answers the question of when. It is decidedly more important, however, the question of where.

Where does history exist?

Since we have established the lack of division between experience, memory, and history, the most fundamental question is as to the location of this agglomerate construction, which we shall henceforth term history, simply for expediency, rather than due to any particular idiosyncrasies bound to the term, which, of course, there are, of a rather ad infinitum nature. History is a social object[xxx]. As a result, it must be located in the group, rather than in the individual[xxxi].

Since we are using history as a term to refer to experience and memory, also, this may be a shocking realization. It is not, however, that much of a break with the tradition – decidedly not so much of one as may be readily assumed. Experience, for us to understand it, must be interpreted[xxxii]. And our interpretive logic is necessarily linguistic, since we are linguistic beings. Our language is socially constructed and, resultantly, our experience is social, too. Similarly, experience is converted to memory. It could be argued that this happens in a state of pre-interpretive logic but this makes no difference to the outcome, from a social perspective. Memory could well be stored, although I doubt it, as a series of sensory readouts in binary form, much like the data from an electroencephalogram machine. If this is the case, however, its storage is only half the battle. Perhaps it is not even half, but I shall concede the potentiality of this point, since it is irrelevant. The other segment is that of recollection, which is not a raw reading of data by any standard. It is interpretive and linguistic in exactly the same manner as is experiential processing and must be, therefore, requisitely social, for the same reason.

Having established the social nature of experience and memory, then, it is a short step to the assumption that history must, at least, act likewise, since it is indistinguishable from those two entities. Our triune concept of history is a collective phenomenon[xxxiii]. It is positioned in the social sphere, not only because of the fact that it can only be transmitted through language, which is inherently social and non-private[xxxiv], but it is socially constructed, through the interpretive nature of multiple memories.

The memory is interpreted by the individual with society’s input. When it is termed history, it has been interpreted by at least two individuals, making it wholly social at its core. These two individuals required for historical interpretation are, as a minimum, the creator of the narrative and the recipient of this creation. Practically speaking, since most history to be considered as such (and that, which is not by many considered as such, also) is written, this translates into the writer and the reader. There is another pragmatic concern, however, and that is the simple matter, once the location and temporality are established, of the creation itself.

How is history created?

History is not a recollection of the facts of the past. It is not a retelling of events from memory. In fact, it has little to do with memory or experiencing events at all. Since it is derived from a potential set of experiences and memories, processed at varying levels through a human mind, creative and manipulative as it naturally must be, the procedure for historical creation is that of pen and paper.

What it truly is, however, beyond simply creative, to be classified by many as history, is perspectival[xxxv]. To write history, one must have a perspective, a viewpoint, from which to witness the events that are being described[xxxvi]. This creative procedure, then, begins with the creation of a viewpoint, typically in the role of an observer. From here, the narrative is told and the history of the event unfolds[xxxvii]. What actually happened, of course, is of exactly no consequence, since it is not known. It is important to note that it was not known at the time, either, by any of the parties involved, due to the incomplete nature of human experience, so there can be no discussion of authenticity[xxxviii]. There is no referent.

The referent disappeared successfully and replaced with the narrative[xxxix], I leave you with two narratives, each told from two starkly different perspectives, to piece together a story in your own mind as to what the event was.

History is in the eye, not of the beholder, but of the reader. Your simulacra awaits.

 

Reference Materials

Appignanesi, Richard. The End of Everything: Postmodernism and the Vanishing of the Human, Cambridge: Totem Books, 2003.

Barthes, Roland. Writing Degree Zero, New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.

Barthes, Roland. “Myth Today” in Mythologies, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972.

Barthes, Roland. “Mythologies” in Mythologies, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972.

Baudrillard, Jean. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Indiana UP, 1995.

Baudrillard, Jean. “Apocalypse Now” in Simulacra and Simulation, Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Baudrillard, Jean. “Simulacra and Science Fiction” in Simulacra and Simulation, Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Baudrillard, Jean. “The Precision of Simulacra” in Simulacra and Simulation, Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Blau, Herbert. “Thinking History, History Thinking” in Theatre Survey 45.2, 2004: 253-261.

Brainerd, Charles and Reyna, Valerie. “Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory: Memory Theory in the Courtroom” in Bjorklund, David. False-memory Creation in Children and Adults: Theory, Research, and Implications, New York: Taylor and Francis Associates, 2000.

Cloud, Dana. “The Limbo of Ethical Simulacra” in Philosophy and Rhetoric 39.1 (2006): 72-84.

Eco, Umberto. Apocalypse postponed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Eldredge, Niles. “The Dynamics of Evolutionary Stasis” in Paleobiology 31.2 (2005):133-145.

Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History” in The National Interest, Summer 1989.

Gabrielle, J. D. E. “Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Memory” in Annual Review of Psychology 49.1 (1998): 87-115.

Gould, Stephen J and Eldredge, Niles. “Punctuated equilibria; the tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered” in Paleobiology 3.2 (1977): 115-151.

Gould, Stephen J. “The Paradox of the First Tier: An Agenda for Paleobiology” in Paleobiology 11.1 (1985): 2-12.

Guillermoprieto, Alma. Looking for History. New York: Random House, 2001.

Hirsch, Marianne. Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997.

Holly Haynes. The History of Make-Believe, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

Jenkins, Keith. Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline, New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2002.

Lakatos, Imre. “History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions” in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970: 91-136.

Mackinder, Halford. “The Geographical Pivot of History” in Geographical Journal 23.4, 1904: 437-444.

Manns, J., Hopkins, R., et al. “ Recognition Memory and the Human Hippocampus” in Neuron 37:1 (2003): 171-180.

Meyer, D. E. and Schvaneveldt, R. W. “Meaning, Memory Structure, and Mental Processes” in Science 192 (1976.4234): 27-33.

Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire” in Representations 26.Supplement (Memory and Counter-Memory), 1989: 7-24.

Reyna, Valerie and Lloyd, Farrell. “Theories of False Memory in Children and Adults” in Learning and Individual Differences 9.2 (1997): 95-123.

Ricoeur, Paul. “Narrative Time” in Critical Inquiry 7.1 in On Narrative (1980): 169-190.

Roedigger, Henry and McDermott, Kathleen. “Creating False Memories: Remembering Words Not Presented in Lists” in Journal of Experimental Psychology – Learning, Memory, and Cognition 21.4 (1995): 803-814.

Rose, Jeremy. Falling, Ottawa: Azure Media Press, 2007. [Pending Release]

Rose, Jeremy. Seeing the Air, Ottawa: Azure Media Press, 2007. [Pending Release]

Ruiz, Maria Regina. “Reconsidering the Past” in The Permeability of History and Literature in Santa Evita and La fiesta del Chivo, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.

White, Hayden. “Rhetoric and History” in Theories of History. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978.

Williams, Linda. “Mirrors Without Memories” in New Challenges for Documentary, San Diego: University of California Press, 1988.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2001, 190.

Woodhead, Leslie. “Dramatized Documentary” in New Challenges for Documentary, San Diego: University of California Press, 1988.

 

[i] Ruiz, Maria Regina. “Reconsidering the Past” in The Permeability of History and Literature in Santa Evita and La fiesta del Chivo, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.

Jenkins, Keith. Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline, New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2002.

Blau, Herbert. “Thinking History, History Thinking” in Theatre Survey 45.2, 2004: 253-261.

[ii] Baudrillard, Jean. “The Precision of Simulacra” in Simulacra and Simulation, Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

[iii] Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire” in Representations 26.Supplement (Memory and Counter-Memory), 1989: 7-24.

[iv] Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History” in The National Interest, Summer 1989.

Woodhead, Leslie. “Dramatized Documentary” in New Challenges for Documentary, San Diego: University of California Press, 1988.

[v] Appignanesi, Richard. The End of Everything: Postmodernism and the Vanishing of the Human, Cambridge: Totem Books, 2003.

[vi] Lakatos, Imre. “History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions” in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970: 91-136.

Mackinder, Halford. “The Geographical Pivot of History” in Geographical Journal 23.4, 1904: 437-444.

[vii] Barthes, Roland. “Mythologies” in Mythologies, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972.

[viii] Baudrillard, Jean. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Indiana UP, 1995.

Hirsch, Marianne. Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997.

[ix] Rose, Jeremy. Falling, Ottawa: Azure Media Press, 2007. [Pending Release]

[x] Rose, Jeremy. Seeing the Air, Ottawa: Azure Media Press, 2007. [Pending Release]

[xi] Williams, Linda. “Mirrors Without Memories” in New Challenges for Documentary, San Diego: University of California Press, 1988.

[xii] Barthes, Roland. “Myth Today” in Mythologies, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972.

[xiii] Baudrillard, Jean. “Simulacra and Science Fiction” in Simulacra and Simulation, Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

[xiv] Gould, Stephen J. “The Paradox of the First Tier: An Agenda for Paleobiology” in Paleobiology 11.1 (1985): 2-12.

[xv] Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History” in The National Interest, Summer 1989.

[xvi] Baudrillard, Jean. “Apocalypse Now” in Simulacra and Simulation, Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Eco, Umberto. Apocalypse postponed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

[xvii] Gould, Stephen J and Eldredge, Niles. “Punctuated equilibria; the tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered” in Paleobiology 3.2 (1977): 115-151.

[xviii] Ricoeur, Paul. “Narrative Time” in Critical Inquiry 7.1 in On Narrative (1980): 169-190.

[xix] White, Hayden. “Rhetoric and History” in Theories of History. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978.

[xx] Baudrillard, Jean. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Indiana UP, 1995.

[xxi] Cloud, Dana. “The Limbo of Ethical Simulacra” in Philosophy and Rhetoric 39.1 (2006): 72-84.

[xxii] Roedigger, Henry and McDermott, Kathleen. “Creating False Memories: Remembering Words Not Presented in Lists” in Journal of Experimental Psychology – Learning, Memory, and Cognition 21.4 (1995): 803-814.

[xxiii] Gabrielle, J. D. E. “Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Memory” in Annual Review of Psychology 49.1 (1998): 87-115.

Reyna, Valerie and Lloyd, Farrell. “Theories of False Memory in Children and Adults” in Learning and Individual Differences 9.2 (1997): 95-123.

Brainerd, Charles and Reyna, Valerie. “Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory: Memory Theory in the Courtroom” in Bjorklund, David. False-memory Creation in Children and Adults: Theory, Research, and Implications, New York: Taylor and Francis Associates, 2000.

[xxiv] Eldredge, Niles. “The Dynamics of Evolutionary Stasis” in Paleobiology 31.2 (2005):133-145.

[xxv] Brainerd, Charles and Reyna, Valerie. “Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory: Memory Theory in the Courtroom” in Bjorklund, David. False-memory Creation in Children and Adults: Theory, Research, and Implications, New York: Taylor and Francis Associates, 2000.

[xxvi] Meyer, D. E. and Schvaneveldt, R. W. “Meaning, Memory Structure, and Mental Processes” in Science 192 (1976.4234): 27-33.

Manns, J., Hopkins, R., et al. “ Recognition Memory and the Human Hippocampus” in Neuron 37:1 (2003): 171-180.

[xxvii] Gabrielle, J. D. E. “Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Memory” in Annual Review of Psychology 49.1 (1998): 87-115.

[xxviii] Manns, J., Hopkins, R., et al. “ Recognition Memory and the Human Hippocampus” in Neuron 37:1 (2003): 171-180.

[xxix] Barthes, Roland. Writing Degree Zero, New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.

[xxx] Baudrillard, Jean. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Indiana UP, 1995.

Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History” in The National Interest, Summer 1989.

[xxxi] Barthes, Roland. “Myth Today” in Mythologies, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972.

Hirsch, Marianne. Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997.

[xxxii] Gabrielle, J. D. E. “Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Memory” in Annual Review of Psychology 49.1 (1998): 87-115.

[xxxiii] Meyer, D. E. and Schvaneveldt, R. W. “Meaning, Memory Structure, and Mental Processes” in Science 192 (1976.4234): 27-33.

Hirsch, Marianne. Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997.

[xxxiv] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2001, 190.

[xxxv] Holly Haynes. The History of Make-Believe, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

[xxxvi] Guillermoprieto, Alma. Looking for History. New York: Random House, 2001.

[xxxvii] Baudrillard, Jean. “The Precision of Simulacra” in Simulacra and Simulation, Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

[xxxviii] Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire” in Representations 26.Supplement (Memory and Counter-Memory), 1989: 7-24.

[xxxix] Baudrillard, Jean. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Indiana UP, 1995.

Cloud, Dana. “The Limbo of Ethical Simulacra” in Philosophy and Rhetoric 39.1 (2006): 72-84.